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CIVIL PROCEDURE
MILTON S. MARCUS and DONALD H. NORMAN*

VNUE

Florida Revenue Act.-The Supreme Court has several times been
called upon to interpret the venue provisions of the Florida Revenue Act.1
In Gay v. Jacksonville Symphony Ass'n,2 the association sought a declaratory
decree for construction of part of the act in the Circuit Court of Duval
County. The defendant-State Comptroller moved for dismissal on the
ground that the action for construction should have been brought in
the Circuit Court of Leon County, the official residence of the comptroller.
On appeal from a denial of the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court
held that the revenue statute provision does not allow suit in other than
Leon County, where the comptroller objects to venue, unless there is
some ".

.

. invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights or an attempt

to seize property is alleged."
This decision is substantially the same as that in Henderson v. Gay,5
an earlier case construing the statute, wherein the court pointed out that
to allow suit in any circuit court of the state where there was no
. . . allegation of an invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights
or of an attempt to seize property" would be unduly burdendsome
because of the numerous suits the comptroller is called upon to defend.
JURISDICTION

Law or equity.-Two decisions involving construction of the rule
governing the transferral of actions commenced in equity to the law docket'
are of interest. The first, Manning v. Clark,5 held that the trial court,
in the order of transferral, should establish the procedure to be followed
with reference to the time in which the parties could make the necessary
alterations in their pleadings. The second, Brass v. Reed," provided that
the plaintiff would be given an opportunity to move that the cause be
transferred to the law side of the docket within thirty days of the
decision of the chancellor that the action was not cognizable in equity.
*Senior students, University of Miami School of Law.
1. FLA. STAT. § 212.15 (1951) (which provides that a taxpayer "shall have
the right" to have an adverse decision by the comptroller reviewed "in any of the
circuit courts of Florida").

2.53 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1951).

3.49 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1950).
4. FLA. STAT., Equity Rules, rule 75 (1951) (which provides that when it
appears that a suit commenced in equity should have been brought as an action at
law, it should forthwith be transferred with only such alterations in the pleadings as
are essential).
5.62
6.
64 So.2d
So.2d 352
646 (Fla.
(Fla. 1952).
1953).
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These cases seem to afford a definite construction of a rule which states
the court's policy in general terms.
In another case,7 the Supreme Court affirmed that the trial court
could not transfer from the law docket to equity, saying: "Since the new
rules are silent on this point and courts of law are limited in procedural
matters by rule or statute, we are driven to the conclusion that there
was no authority to transfer this cause to the Equity docket."
PROCESS

Forn.-The court discussed the requirement of the clerk's signature
on a summons, before the summons could be properly "issued" in a civil
action,8 in a sound decision.9 An order was entered in the Circuit
Court for Palm Beach County quashing service of process on the ground
that the original summons served was not signed by the clerk as required
by law, but giving leave for the amendment of the original summons
by placing thereon the clerk's signature, service to be effective from the
latter date. The Supreme Court held that the original unsigned paper,
called a "summons," was void, and not susceptible of amendment by
direction to the clerk to addend his signature after service.
This decision clearly follows the court's policy as enunciated in the
rule "' that a summons shall be "issued" by the clerk; such a printed
form with only the names of plaintiff and defendant inserted thereon,
without authority to authenticate it, is not a "process."
PRE- TRIAL CONFERENCE

Failure to attend.-In Beasley v. Cisten," the circuit court entered
an order dismissing the cause with prejudice with costs to the plaintiff
in an action in which plaintiff's counsel failed to appear for a pre-trial
conference. The Supreme Court held that the rule that counsel is the
litigant's agent and that his acts are those of his principal,' 2 does not
justify dismissal of the cause with prejudice upon failure of counsel to
attend, since such a dismissal would punish the litigant instead of counsel.
The court has power to discipline counsel for refusal or failure to attend
such a conference, and a refusal may warrant a citation for contempt
or a lesser degree of punishment.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Wood v. Wagner, 55 So.Zd 537 (Fla. 1951).
FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 5(b) (1951).
Ball v. Jones, 65 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1953).
FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 5(b) (1951).
61 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952).

12. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 16 (1951).
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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE FOR PREJUDICE

Affidavits.-In Hahn v. Frederick,'3 petitioner appealed the refusal of
the judge below to disqualify himself for prejudice in pending litigation,
The Supreme Court held that the terms of the disqualification statute t 4
that petitioner's affidavit be supported "in substance" by those of two other
persons, were not met by the two supporting affidavits which said they
believed petitioner's affidavit to be true. The reason advanced for the
holding by the Supreme Court was that affidavits alleged on information
and belief are insufficient in any instance where it is required that the
affidavit attest to the substantive truth of matters alleged and not mere!y
to good faith.
Justice Terrell pointed out in his dissent that this interpretation does
not further the primary object of the statute-the protection of litigants
where there is a "fear" of prejudice.
DscovnRt
5
Refusal to give deposition.-In a separate maintenance proceeding
instituted by a wife after her husband abandoned her and returned to
New Jersey, the Supreme Court affirmed a decree entered in favor of
the wife from which the husband had appealed. Upon the failure of
the husband to comply with an alternative order requiring him to appear
in Florida to give a deposition or to pay the expenses necessary for
plaintiff or her attorney to take his deposition in New Jersey, the trial
judge struck the husband's answer and entered a final decree in favor
of the wife in an ex parte proceeding.
In affirming the decree, the Supreme Court seemed impressed by
the substantial wealth and the bad faith of the husband. Were it not
for these facts, the rule' 6 that a defendant should not be required to
travel any great distance in order to be examined by plaintiff for discovery
purposes where no counterclaims or affirmative defenses are involved
might well apply.

Motion to inspect: Discretionary power of the court.-Where
defendants appealed from a denial of a motion in the trial court for
the inspection of an object, the Supreme Court held that the granting
or denial of such a motion for inspection is a matter of discretion and
not of right.' 7 In affirming the denial, the Supreme Court said that the
burden is on the movants to show that the court clearly abused its
discretion in denying the motion, and that movants suffered thereby.
13,
14.
15.
16.
17,

66 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1953).
FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1951).
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 63 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1953).
FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 30(d) (1951).
Certain Underwriters v. Hawthorne Flying Service, 63 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1953).
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Here the object sought to be inspected was the engine of an insured
aircraft allegedly destroyed. Movant-insurers sought to detemine the
percentage of structural damage by an expensive and time-consuming
internal inspection of the engine, while the court felt that an external
examination was far more practical.
COMPLAINT
8
Motion to arnend.-ln Twynan v. Livingston, an action for damages
based on an oral agreement for the purchase and resale of realty, the
Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the defendant. It was held, on
appeal, that where an order was entered by the trial court overruling
defendant's demurrers directed to two counts of the plaintiffs declaration,
it was error for the trial court to refuse plaintiff's application to amend
these counts when the court subsequently determined they were fatally
defective. This decision seems wholly within the spirit of the rule
regarding the amendment of pleadings.'
Bill of partiulars.-Concerning itself with the rule providing for
clarification of the pleadings, 20 the court, inMoore v. Boyd, 21 held that
the inadequacy of a complaint following the form of the common counts
as set forth in a repealed statute,2 2 justified the defendant's request for
a bill of particulars before answering to the complaint, Itwas error to
treat his motion therefore as a nullity and to enter a default judgment
on defendant's failure to answer within the time prescribed.

JURY TRIAL

Discretion of court.-In Wood v. Warriner,23 the Supreme Court
construed the rule regarding a demand for a jury trial, 24 holding that it
was within the discretion of the trial judge to allow a party to amend his
pleadings and obtain a jury even as late as the day of trial. This is a
most liberal interpretation of the rle and follows the answer of the
court to a certified question in Foundation of Youth Broadcasting Co. v.
25
Church.
Again broadly interpreting the rule20 and pointing out its purpose
was to relieve congested court dockets, not to deprive litigants of jury
trial where desired, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling that
18. 58 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1952).
19. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 15 (1951).

20,

FLA. STAT.

Common Law Rules, rule N1 (1951).

21. 62 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1952).
22, FLA. STAT. § 51.03 (1-6) (1951).

23, 62 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1952).
24, FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 31 (1951) (which provides that unless
either party demands a jury trial in his pleadings, it shall be waived).
25. 51 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1951).
26. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 31 (1951).
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a demand for jury trial filed with the amended complaint, but in a
separate document, did not meet the requirements of the rule, The fact
that the request was in a separate document is unimportant if timely
made, and timeliness is largely a matter of trial court discretion.27
Summary proeedures.-In the case of Dezen v. Slatcof,28 the Circuit
Court for Dade County entered an order of execution for sheriff's levy
on a car owned by the defendant. Answering an order to show cause
2
why her ownership of the car should not be set aside as fraudulent,
the defendant demanded jury trial. The circuit court did not err in
refusing defendant's demand. The rule as to demand for jury trial 0
does not apply to such limited summary procedures authorized by statute.
The defendant could have jury trial by complying with the rule relating
to claims of third parties to property taken under levy.?'
TAKING TESTIMONY

Extension of time.-Discussing extensions of time for taking testimony,
the Supreme Court in Hewett V. Hewett,3 2 held that the rule3 3 required
that there be cause shown for the granting of further time, and that the
cause must be expressed in the record; since there was no showing of
excusable neglect in failing to take testimony within the time allowed,
an extension for this purpose was error.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Statute of limitations.-In Tuggle v. Maddox,34 the Supreme Court

held that the trial court erred in dismissing ex nero motu an action by
a divorced wife against her ex-husband for expenses which she had
incurred in supporting a child of the parties. The ground for the decision
was that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, since the
ex-husband had not pleaded the statute as an affirmative defense. 5
This decision clearly follows the rule which requires that such defenses
must be affirmatively pleaded.3 8
Pleading of waiver or estoppel.-In an action on a life insurance
policy by the beneficiary,37 defendant-insurer raised in its answer the
27. Messara v. Maule Industries, Inc., 50 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1951).
28. 66 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1953).
29. FLA. STAT. § 55.57 (1951) (which provides for setting aside of transfers of
property where fraudulent as to a judgment creditor).
30. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 31 (1951).
31. FLA. STAr. Common Law Rules, rule 43 (1951).
32. 65 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1953).
33. FLA. STAT. Equity Rules, rule 46 (1951) (which permits extensions of time
for taking of testimony only on "good cause shown").
34. 60 So.2d 158 (Fla, 1952); accord, Proctor v. Schombcrg, 63 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1953).
35. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 8(a) (1951).
36. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 9(d) (1951).
37. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 59 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1952).
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affirmative defense of fraud in the medical history of the insured. Without
filing a reply, plaintiff attempted to show at trial that defendant was
estopped to assert fraud, since the agent of the insurer had compiled
the medical history in question. Defendant's objection to the introduction
of such proof was overruled. On appeal judgment for plaintiff was
reversed, and a new trial granted by a divided Supreme Court (4-3). The
majority opinion held that in accord with the rule that waiver or estoppel
must be affirmatively pleaded to meet an affirmative defense raised by
defendant, 8 it was error to admit such proof. The minority opinion
argued that to require a formal pleading by the plaintiff to assert estoppel
to offset defendant's affirmative defense of fraud was a needless technicality.
There is merit in the dissent's contention, but any change in this procedure
should come as an amendment to the rule.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Effect of denial of motion to dismiss.-In an action against restaurant
operators for food poisoning, 39 the Circuit Court for Dade County denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, but granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment, on the ground that the pleadings
and depositions showed that plaintiff did not have a cause of action as a
matter of law, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed
this judgment, holding that the trial court determined the presence
or absence of a cause of action in plaintiff's favor when it denied defendant's
motion to dismiss, and could not thereafter grant summary judgment on
the ground proposed.
This decision seems a reasonable interpretation of the rule concerning
40
summary judgment.
Affidavits.-In MacGregor v. Hosaek,4 ' an action to recover a broker's
commission, defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the trial court, although plaintiff offered an affidavit in support of his
complaint and denying defendant's affimative defense, to which defendant
presented no counter-affidavit. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed
and gave judgment for the plaintiff, since defendant could not prevail
on a motion for summary judgment without supporting affidavits, if
plaintiff denies the defenses under oath.
DIsMISSAL AND NON-SUIT

Non-suit as a matter of right.-In a tort action 42 to which defendant

interposed the defense of statute of limitations, the trial court announced
38.

FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 9(d) (1951).
39. Wilson v. Bachrach, 65 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1953).
40. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 43 (1951).
41. 58 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1952).
42. Crews v. Woods, 59 So.2d 526 (la. 1952).
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that upon a proper motion made by defendant it would render summary
judgment. Plaintiff moved for a non-suit which he claimed was due
him as a "matter of right" where the court has announced its intention
to render an adverse peremptory ruling." a The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion and was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court distinguished
between allowing plaintiff an involuntary non-suit in the face of an
adverse ruling which is preclusive of recovery because the plaintiff fails
in that particular suit to prove his cause of action, and disallowing a
non-suit in a case in which the adverse ruling is preclusive of recovery
under any circumstances (as here where based upon the statute of
limitations). In the latter instance, plaintiff has no involuntary non-suit
as of right, and a summary judgment may be res judicata.
This decision apparently lends the certainty of judicial construction
to a perhaps indefinite rule.
Involuntary dismissal: Want of prosecution.-The statute providing
for dismissal for want of prosecution 44 has been interpreted and discussed
by the Supreme Court in a generous number of decisions. It was held
that where an action was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and neither a
motion for reinstatement of the cause was made nor an appeal taken from
the order of dismissal, the court was without jurisdiction to order reinstate45
ment after one month had elapsed.
In Railway Express Agency v. Hoagland,46 the court held the fact
that the plaintiff was sojourning in Europe and had not been in contact
with her counsel was insufficient to show "good cause" necessary to reinstate
an action dismissed for want of prosecution. In Suddeth Realty Co. v.
Wright,47 the chancellor dismissed the cause of action after seven years
ex mero mot. Plaintiff sought reinstatement on the ground that an oral
motion for transferral to law and an oral application to amend, both
made sonic four years earlier, had never been ruled upon. An order
reinstating the cause was granted below, but was reversed by the Supreme
Court on review. The court felt that plaintiff's failure to secure a ruling
over so long a period ought to preclude reinstatement; if formal motions
had been made, they would have been ruled on forthwith.
Dismissal for want of prosecution does not, of course, bar a further
43. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 35(b) (1951) (the rule relating to
non-suits which provides ". . . that nothing stated herein shall preclude a non-suit from
being taken pursuant to any applicable statute.").

The Florida non-suit statute is

FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1951) under which it has been the long-established rule that
plaintiff is entitled, as of right, to a voluntary or involuntary non-suit, the latter
in case the trial court announces that it will render an adverse peremptory ruling. In
such an instance, plaintiff would be able to obtain judicial review of the sufficiency
of his evidence.
44. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1951).
45. B. & L. Trucking Co. v. Loftin, 63 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1953).
46. 62 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1952).
47. 55 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1951).
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4
action. In Hassenteufel v. Howard Johnson, Inc. of Floridas
8 the lower
court specified that the dismissal was with prejudice. The Supreme Court,
on appeal, held a later action on the cause was not barred. 'rhe statute
does not authorize such dismissal, nor was the decision on the merits.
Reinstatement of the cause was sought in Gulf Appliance Distributors,
Inc. v. Long,49 on the ground that an order allowing substitution of counsel
had been entered for the plaintiff and so there was no want of prosecution
for the requisite period. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying
reinstatement of the cause. The activity required to toll the running

of the statute is some ".

.

. active measure taken by the plaintiff and

intended and calculated to hasten suit to judgment." Reinstatement
of the cause requires such grounds as would justify refusal to dismiss in
the first instance.
Death of a sole plaintiff tolls the running of the statute until an
administrator of the decedent's estate has been duly appointed and
qualified. In Gregory v. Circuit Court,50 such order of dismissal for want
of prosecution was reversed by the Supreme Court. As the court acutely
observed, until appointment of the administrator there was no one in esse
able to prosecute the suit and take further action in the cause.
In National Surety Corp. Y.Grahn,5' plaintiff appealed from an order
granting a motion of dismissal for want of prosecution. The Supreme
Court held that where, by the statute,5 2 the circuit judge still had jurisdiction
to reinstate the cause, the appeal taken by the plaintiff was premature.
INSTRU-nONS

Assignment of error.-An interesting construction of the rule regarding
errors ininstructions to a jury"3 was given by the Supreme Court in Bradley
v. Associates Discount Corp. 54 The court held therein that the term
"assignment of error" is not descriptive of challenges to rulings presented
by way of motion for a new trial, hut applies to attacks launched in
the appellate court after the trial court has disposed of the controversy.
Repetition of charge to jury.-In XVarmouth v. Greenberg,15 the
Supreme Court interpreted the statute authorizing the trial court to
repeat its instructions to a jury returning without a decision. 6 It was
there held that it was not error for the trial judge to repeat only portions
48. 52 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1951).
49. 53 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1951).
50. 56 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1952).
51. 57 So.2d 457 (Fia. 1952).
52. FLx STAT. § 45.19 (1951).
53. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 39(b) (1951) (which provides that
. no party may assign as error the giving of any instruction unless he objects
thereto.").
54. 58 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1952).
55. FLA. STAT. § 54.22 (1951).
56. 49 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1951).
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of the charge where the jury desires only to hear that part of a charge
dealing with a particular issue. To require a repetition of the entire charge
under all circumstances would be impracticable.
NEw TRL4L
When no verdict is returned.-Interpreting the rule concerning the
procedure to be followed when a jury fails to return a verdict,"7 the
Supreme Court in Gore v. Hansen,"" held that where the trial court denied
a motion for entry of judgment in accordance with a motion for directed
verdict after the cause had gone to the jury and resulted in a mistrial,
but did not expressly order a new trial, the trial court's order would be
considered as equivalent to an order for a new trial.
Filing of motion.-In a decision relating to the formal procedure
involved in filing application for a new trial, the Supreme Court held, in
9 that a motion
Hillsboro Plantation, Inc. v. Plunkett,"
for a new trial
is filed "to the trial judge" when presented to the clerk and entered by
him on a progress docket. This ruling was reaffirmed in Mead v. Bentley.,0
Apparently counsel had questioned this interpretation of the rule,6' and
had argued that filing of such a motion must be made with the judge
personally. The court lucidly pointed out that this position is ridiculous,
since the volume of business handled in the courts today clearly precludes
such a procedure.
Another decision relating to filing and serving motions for a new
trial was Springer v. Morris.02 Here the court noted that the statutory
requirement that a copy of a motion for a new trial to be presented to
the judge must be served on the opposite party or his attorney with
three days notice of the time and place at which the motion would be
heard was abrogated by the new rule of procedure." The motion would
not be dismissed for the want of service of a copy when the other
requisites of the rule had been met.
Statement of grounds.-In Booker v. Saunders Realty Co.,6 5 the lower
court issued an order for new trial without specifying therein the grounds
on which the motion was granted. In reviewing the order, the Supreme
Court held this was error. The rule requires that the court specify
the grounds for new trial in the order granting it.
57. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 40(c) (1951) (which provides that if a
verdict is not returned, the trial court may direct entry of judgment as if requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial).
58. 59 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1952).
59. 59 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1952).
60. 61 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1952).
61. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 41 (1951).
62. 598So.2d 859 (Fla. 1952).
63. FLA. STAT. § 54.24 (1951).
64. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 41 (1951).
65. 53 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1951).
66. FLA. STAT. Common Law Rules, rule 39(d) (1951).

VACATION OF ORDER

Result thereof.-In Florida Power and Light Co. v. Knost, 7 the
Supreme Court held that the action of the circuit judge in subsequently
vacating an order overruling an objection to certain interrogatories would
have to be construed as an admission that such an order should not
have been entered in the first place. 1This decision seems implicit in the
rle8 governing the subject.
SEr-INO JUDGMENT ASIDE

Showing good cause.-The Supreme Court, in Lewis v. Jennings,'"
reversed an order of the Circuit Court for Dade County which vacated
a judgment for the plaintiff. The court held that since defendant had
failed to appear on the day of trial for the second time, and no explanation
for such absence had been given except that the notice of trial had not
been seen, the lower court had abused its discretion in vacating the
judgment.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

Determination of constitutional questions.-In State Road Dep't v.
Forehand0 the circuit court certified to the Supreme Court a question
of the constitutionality of a statute.7 1 The majority held the statute
valid. Three members of the court dissented on the ground that the
question of constitutionality was not properly presented. The rule as to
certification does not, by its terms, exclude questions of constitutionality,
and it appears that there is precedent for the decision of a question of
constitutionality of a statute where sought by certified question in the
2
case of Rudisill v. Tampa.7
In a concurring opinion Justice Hobson, pointing out the danger
of overcrowding the Supreme Court docket by allowing blanket certification
of constitutional questions, suggests that whether such a question should
be allowed certification should be discretionary with the Supreme Court
and determined by ". . . whether the question is of great public concern
and has attendant upon it exigencies which dictate a speedy decision of
the controversy in the interest of the common weal."

67. 65 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953).

STAT. Supreme Court Rules, rule 35(f) (1951).
69. 64 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1953).
70. 56 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1952).
71. FLA. STAT. Supreme Court Rules, rule ;8 (1951).

68. See FiA.

72. 9 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1942).

